


# Context-aware IPv6 Address Hopping

**Matthias Marx**, Monina Schwarz, Maximilian Blochberger,  
Frederik Wille, Hannes Federrath

# Motivation and Idea


## Application Layer



## Network Layer

# Motivation and Idea

## Application Layer




## Network Layer




# Motivation and Idea

## Application Layer



## Network Layer



## Motivation and Idea

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- IPv6 addresses have 128 bit  $2^{128} \approx 3.4 \times 10^{38}$
- ISPs assign at least one 64 bit IPv6 prefix to home users  
2001:db8:85a3:8a2e::/64  $2^{64} \approx 1.8 \times 10^{19}$
- Only a fraction of these IP addresses are used today
  - One or few IP addresses per device
  - New tracking opportunities arise
  - IPv6 Privacy Extension does not protect against tracking
- We will utilize the large IPv6 address space  
**A distinct outbound IPv6 address for each visited website**

## Related Work

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### Address hopping for **enhanced privacy**

- IPv6 Privacy Extension
  - Temporary, random addresses for outbound connections
  - IP addresses are usually used for one day
- Virtual protocol stack
  - Alter identifiers on all layers: MAC, IPs, ...
- *Address Hopping NAT*
  - ISP mixes IP addresses of packets sent by customers

## Related Work

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### Address hopping for **enhanced security**

- Rotate the addresses of both, sender and receiver
- Moving target defense

### **Context isolation** in web browsers for

- Security
- Privacy
- Robustness and performance



## Design Goals

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- **Unlinkability**


A third party must not be able to link visitors on different websites to the same user based on the IP address

- **No perceptible influence** on the browsing performance

- **Transparent** to the user


- **Backwards compatible** to existing web applications and Internet infrastructure

## Browsing with plain Firefox Browser



- All tabs use the same IP address
- The tracker can link activities based on the IP address

## Context-aware IPv6 Address Hopping



- We use many IP addresses on a per-destination basis
- The tracker can not link activities based on the IP address


## Address Generation

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$2001 : db8 : 85a3 :: 8a2e : 370 : 7334$   
subnet prefix                      interface identifier


- Interface identifiers can be varied easily
- Prefix needs to be varied, too. Otherwise: prefix-based tracking
- The prefix can not be varied easily without changing the infrastructure
  - **Prefix Bouquets**  
ISPs could delegate multiple prefixes to one user
  - **Prefix Sharing**  
ISPs could delegate the same prefix to multiple users

## Prefix Sharing: uniqueness of IP addresses is not guaranteed



1. Prevent collisions: ensure IP address uniqueness
2. Detect collisions

## Implementation




- Alternative proxy for the Tor Browser
- Makes use of the Tor browser's website isolation feature but the traffic is not routed through Tor

## Evaluation

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- **Unlinkability**
  - Different outbound IP addresses for different websites
  - Prefix is changed to a certain degree only
- **No perceptible influence** on the browsing performance
- **Transparent** to the user
  - Not interfering with applications
  - Nothing to configure
- **Backwards compatible** to existing web applications and Internet infrastructure
  - HTTP & WebSocket protocol
  - Third-party authentication services

## Evaluation: Performance



Time that is needed to retrieve and render a website



## Future Work

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- How can ISPs provide users with multiple and frequently changing IPv6 prefixes?
- Extend the context-aware approach to other applications and the operating system
- How can existing anonymous communication networks such as Tor be made more context-aware?

## Conclusion

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- We introduced context-aware IPv6 address hopping to prevent IP address-based tracking
  - A distinct outbound IPv6 address for each visited website**
- A prototype has been implemented
- Impact on browsing performance is negligible
- In combination with application-level measures, effective protection against tracking can be achieved



## Context-aware IPv6 Address Hopping

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Slides:  
<https://marx.wtf/2019-12-ICICS.pdf>

## Evaluation: Performance

Website	Firefox		Prototype		Tor Browser		3rd-party Resources
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
google.com	0.43	0.11	0.42	0.06	7.96	4.09	3
youtube.com	1.78	0.68	1.91	0.49	8.79	2.16	10
facebook.com	1.07	0.16	1.23	0.20	9.55	2.27	1
wikipedia.org	0.19	0.10	0.22	0.05	1.76	0.50	0
yahoo.com	0.51	0.25	0.48	0.13	3.88	1.49	1
Alexa Top 10	0.27	0.49	0.28	0.51	2.13	3.32	3
Alexa Top 100	0.30	0.72	0.64	0.39	2.28	4.74	12.26