




# Enhanced Performance and Privacy for Core Internet Protocols

Erik Sy

# Motivation




Transport protocols should not allow distinguishing Alice and Bob as the sender of a message.

# Motivation


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- Increase the quality of experience for web users
  - The delay of the connection establishments presents a significant overhead of an average web flow


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# Investigated Protocols




# Introducing Resolver-Less DNS



# Introducing Resolver-Less DNS<sup>1</sup>

- Web server provides relevant DNS records to it's clients
  - Improves client's privacy posture towards resolver & reduces delay




## Validation Mechanisms of Resolver-Less DNS

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- Client does not send application data to presented IP address before a successful validation of the used DNS record
- Preferred validation mechanism uses server authentication during connection establishment
- Fallback validation mechanism includes traditional DNS lookup to make a comparison between both DNS records


# Performance Evaluation of Resolver-Less DNS

- 1% of clients saves at least 80ms per DNS query compared to status quo






# Introducing TCP Fast Open (RFC 7413, Dec 2014)



# Introducing TCP Fast Open (RFC 7413)

- Allows validating the client's IP address without an additional round trip




# User Tracking via TCP Fast Open

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- Main findings<sup>2</sup>
  - Fast Open cookies present a kernel-based tracking mechanism
  - Tracking feasible for network observer
  - Feasible tracking periods are unrestricted
  - Enables tracking across private browsing modes, browser restarts, and different applications
- Reactions by browser vendors
  - Mozilla stopped using TFO within Firefox
  - Microsoft stopped using TFO within the private browsing mode of Edge


## Performance Limitation of TCP Fast Open

- Requirement of matching server IP address for abbreviated handshakes does not anticipate real-world load balancing




# Proposed TCP Fast Open Privacy

- Cross-layer approach to mitigate privacy and performance issues of TFO



# Introducing TLS Session Resumption



# Introduction to TLS Session Resumption


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- Allows a client-server pair to establish a new TLS connection with a previously exchanged symmetric key
  - Reduces the delay and the computational overhead of TLS handshakes
  - Server can uniquely identify clients based on this secret key
- Deployment on the Internet
  - 96% of TLS-enabled Alexa Top Million Sites support TLS resumption
  - All popular web browsers support this feature, which is included in every TLS version

# Tracking via TLS Session Resumption

## ■ Main findings<sup>3</sup>


- Safari and Firefox can be tracked for at least 24h using this mechanism
- Prolongation attack extends feasible tracking periods
- Only TLS v1.3 protects against tracking by network observer
- Most browsers do not protect against third-party tracking via TLS SR





## Domain Trees of popular Websites<sup>4</sup>

- Alexa Top 1K Site requires on average 20.24 connections to different hosts
- These hostnames form on average 9.49 TLS trust groups<sup>1</sup>



4: Sy et al. “Enhanced Performance for the encrypted Web through TLS Resumption across Hostnames” (2019)

## Proposed TLS 1.3 Extension

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- TLS 1.3 allows resumptions across hostnames, if the corresponding hostnames can be validated via the same server certificate
- Server signals that a group of hostnames mutually support TLS resumptions
  - Presented server certificate needs to be valid for these hostnames
- SAN-list of certificate can be used to define this group
  - Adds complexity to the generation of server certificates
  - Helps to avoid resumptions to hostnames for which the cert is not valid
- Extension for the NewSessionTicket frame

# Performance of TLS 1.3 Connection Establishments

- Elapsed time

<b>Network latency</b>	<b>Initial</b>	<b>1-RTT resumed</b>	<b>0-RTT resumed</b>
0.3 ms	29.2 ms	6.3 ms	6.6 ms
50 ms	190.1 ms	160.1 ms	109.6 ms
100 ms	340.8 ms	310.3 ms	209.7 ms

- CPU time


<b>Peer</b>	<b>Initial</b>	<b>1-RTT resumed</b>	<b>0-RTT resumed</b>
Server	7.8 ms	2.3 ms	2.6 ms
Client	9.2 ms	2.4 ms	2.5 ms

## Results for an average Website

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- Converts about 58.7% of the required full TLS handshakes to resumed connection establishments
- Reduces the required CPU time for the TLS connection establishments by about 44%
- Reduces the elapsed time to establish all required TLS connections by up to 30.6%

# Introducing QUIC




# Introduction to the QUIC Transport Protocol

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- QUIC is going to replace TLS over TCP in HTTP/3
- Improves problems of TLS over TCP
  - Protocol Entrenchment
  - Implementation Entrenchment
  - Handshake Delay
  - Head-of-line Blocking
  - Mobility
- Google's QUIC protocol is already widely deployed on the Internet
  - Accounts for 7% of global Internet traffic
  - Supported by Google Chrome (approx. 60% browser market share)

## Tracking via Source-Address Token

- Source-address token speed up the validation of the client's IP address in subsequent connections between the same peers



## Tracking via QUIC's Server Config

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- QUIC's server config contains a public key used to bootstrap the cryptographic connection establishment
- Client reuses server config across different connections
- Tracking feasible if server distributes unique server configs/ server config identifiers to its clients



# Tracking via QUIC

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- Main findings<sup>5</sup>
  - Default configuration of Chrome enables unlimited tracking periods
  - Third-party tracking feasible via this mechanism for Chrome
  - Network observers may track user's via QUIC's server config
- Reactions by browser vendors
  - Google Chrome restricts feasible tracking periods to one week


## Shared Client IP Address Validation<sup>6</sup>

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- QUIC server having a TLS trust-relation accept source-address tokens generated by each other
  - Each accepted source-address token allows client-server pair to save a round trip time during the connection establishment
- Novel QUIC transport parameter is used to inform the client about other hosts accepting a provided validation token


## Performance Improvements for the average Website (1/2)

- Proposal saves a round-trip time on 58.75% of the established connections




## Performance Improvements for the average Website (2/2)

- Longest path of sequential connections with retry is reduced by 39.1%




# Shared IP Address Validation using Out-Of-Band Token<sup>7</sup>

- Distribution of out-of-band validation token via DNS resolver or other QUIC server




## Performance gains based on Out-Of-Band Validation Token

- Each initial QUIC connection establishment can save up to a RTT



## Introducing the QuicSocks Design<sup>8</sup>

- Assumes a QuicSocks Proxy colocated with the DNS resolver




8: Sy et al. "Accelerating QUIC's Connection Establishment on High-Latency Access Networks" (2019)

# Analytical Performance Evaluation

- Proposal achieves better performance if  $RTT_{Server} < RTT_{direct}$


Stateless retry	Latency to establish connection (incl. DNS)	
	Status quo	Proposal
w/o	$RTT_{DNS} + RTT_{direct}$	$RTT_{DNS} + RTT_{Server}$
with	$RTT_{DNS} + 2 * RTT_{direct}$	$RTT_{DNS} + 2 * RTT_{Server}$





# Empirical Performance Evaluation

- 24.3% of nodes saves at least 15ms without and 30ms with stateless retry




## Recommended Privacy Protections

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- Deactivate TCP Fast Open
- Applications restricting tracking via HTTP cookies should apply the same limitations to tracking via the presented mechanisms in TLS and QUIC
- Deploying resolver-less DNS

## The Performance versus Privacy Trade-off

- Short lifetime for the investigated tracking mechanisms provides already significant performance gains while limiting feasible tracking periods



## Conclusion

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- TCP Fast Open, TLS, and QUIC contain mechanisms that can severely harm the privacy of users
- Popular browsers do not sufficiently protect against these privacy risks
- Investigated mechanisms should be used with a short expiration time to balance the performance versus privacy trade-off
- Several performance optimizations are feasible for core Internet protocols

Thank you

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## Questions and Answers

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Slides: <https://erik-sy.de/brave>